Economic Crisis 2008 Essay Topics
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America Financial Crisis
The expression financial crisis broadly applies to a number of cases in which the vital financial assets rapidly lose a great proportion of their nominal value. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, numerous financial instabilities have a high link to banking panics and numerous recessions coincided with the panics. Other circumstance often referred to as financial instability consists of stock market crashes and bursting of other money bubbles, currency instability as well as sovereign defaults. Financial instability directly leads to a great loss of paper affluence but hardly result in adjustments within the real economy (Dwyer, 2009).
Different economists and scholars often offer hypothesis about how financial instability grows and how to prevent the undesirable condition. However, there lacks consensus and financial instability continue to be witnesses occasionally. This paper will describe the nature, causes and probable solutions of the major financial crisis experienced in the United States between 2008 and 2012. The paper also addresses the fine details of the crisis highlighting on some issues such as; questions of who was responsible for the undesirable financial condition. Some basic theories relating to the cause of the challenge. The public policies applicable to deal satisfactorily with the identified causes. Some steps taken by congress and Obama government to deal with the matter, and lastly whether the adopted measures were effective or not.
Nature of the crisis
Firstly, the great recession has a direct link with the major banking crisis witnessed during the period. Bank in the entire United States were suffering massive and rapid withdrawal of financial by depositors; a phenomenon known as a bank run. In all the cases, banks and financial institutions lend out majority of the funds they collect in forms of deposits (Dwyer, 2009). Therefore, it was challenging the same institution to back swiftly all the deposits while being demand at once. The occurrence results to a situation where clients lose their deposits. This was to the extent that insurance deposits hardly covered them. Banking panic or systematic banking crisis is a situation in which major financial institutions face runs. Banking crisis was not very eminent during the United States great recession, but it fairly characterized the financial instability.
Secondly, the 2008 crisis was characterized with speculative crashed and bubbles. Witnessing of a speculative bubble is during an even of massive, sustained and persistent overpricing of various classes of assets. A major factor that facilitates the occurrence is the availability of customers who buy an asset based mainly on the speculations of reselling the same asset at a better price, as opposed to computing the revenue the asset will create in the future. In the event that a bubble is experienced, risk of a crash is eminent, as well.
A crash is a situation in which price of assets are conflicting and hence customers will only proceed with the purchase if they expect other market participants to purchase. In such an event, a large proportion might decide to sell causing a fall in prices. Nevertheless, it is quite challenging to make a prediction on whether a financial asset price will actually equate to its fundamental value. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the reliability of the bubbles. Some economists and scholars insist that bubbles never experienced during the United States during the recession. However, all indications show that the situation was almost getting to that level (Nanto & Library of Congress, 2009).
The third characteristic of the great recession was the international financial crisis. For a country that uses the fixed exchange rate, a situation may arise when the financial sector is compelled to devalue the currency of the nations to accommodate speculative attacks. This state of affairs is the balance of payment instability or a currency crisis. In case the state is unable to settle its foreign financial debt, this phenomenon is sovereign default. It is important noting that, at times, both devaluation and default might be because of a voluntary decision by the administration. However, state of affairs emerges as the inevitable consequences of adjustments in financial investor decision that results to a prompt stop in capital returns or an unexpected rise in capital flight. Largely these circumstances described the situation during the great recession in the United States.
Wider economic crisis
Negative gross domestic product growth that extends beyond two quarters is a recession. A substantially severe or prolonged recession often turns out to be a depression. On the other hand, a prolonged period of sluggish but not certainly negative growth in GDP is economic stagnation. Economists during the U.S crisis believed that the undesirable situation was because of financial instability. Some economist and scholars, however, believed that the recession led to financial challenges and not the vice versa. The argument is that in cases where financial crisis act as the initial disturbance that initiates a recession, other components might be more crucial in prolonging and worsening the recession period (Nanto, & Library of Congress, 2009).
Causes of the financial crisis and their consequences
1. Strategic complementary within the financial markets.
Arguments exists that successful and efficient investment demands that each market participant in the financial market to predict the intentions of the other investor. Soros George, a great American economist, described this necessity to predict the aspirations and intentions of the other market investors as reflexivity. On the same note, John Maynard Keynes, a 1930s economist, compared a financial sector to a beauty competition game, where participants attempts to guess the model other players in the contest will consider extremely outstanding. Self-fulfilling prophecies and circularity may be overrated when reliable data is not accessible because of partial disclosures or lack of disclosure altogether.
Moreover, in numerous cases market participants are motivated to coordinate their individual choices. For instance, an investor who feels that other market players are willing to purchase a certain currency in masses may anticipate that the value of that other currency will go up. As such, the investor is also enticed to buy the same currency in anticipation of making high returns. Similarly, a depositor in a certain bank who anticipates that other depositors will withdraw their finances may predict collapsing of a bank and, therefore, he/she may have an incentive to withdraw his investment, as well. Scholars describe the drive to mimic the plans of other investors a strategic complementarity.
Economists and financial analysts argue that if firms and individuals portrays a sufficiently powerful incentive to imitate the actions of the other market players, then there is witnessing of a phenomenon called self-fulfilling prophecies. For instance, if a firm feels that the value of a certain currency will go up, this may result to the eventual rise in its value. Alternatively, if a bank depositor anticipates that the bank will deteriorate, the bank may surely fail. Therefore, there is a perception that financial instability behaves like a vicious circle where investors avoid some financial assets or institution anticipating that others will shun them, as well. This was the case in America during the great financial crisis of 2008.
Leverage, in the financial sector means acquiring investment’s funds through borrowing. There is a frequent assumption that excessive borrowing is the contributor of the financial crisis in America. When an individual or financial institution only invests their own funds, they can in the extremely worst scenarios, lose their own cash. However, when there is borrowing of the better part investment’s funds, the firms and individuals can potentially gain more from their investment but they can lose in excess of what they own, as well. Therefore, borrowing investment funds augments the potential gains from investment, but generates a bankruptcy threat, as well (Dwyer, 2009).
Since the bankruptcy implies a situation where an individual, a firm or a country fails to settle all its financial obligations to lenders, it may extend financial challenges from party to the other. The average level of leverage to an economy usually grows before a financial crisis arises. For instance, borrowing to fund investment within the stock market become increasingly and amazingly common following the 1929, Wall Street Crash. Additionally, some scholars and economists have suggested that financial institutions might fuel fragility by smacking leverage, and thereby fueling the underpricing of risk. Leverage was a major contributor to the instabilities experienced in 2008 in American continent.
3. Asset-liability mismatch
Asset-liability mismatch is another factor argued to have fueled the undesirable financial market in the United States. Witnessing of this phenomenon is where the risks linked to the firm’s assets and debt appear inappropriately aligned. For instance, commercial bank provides deposit accounts to clients. There can be frequent withdrawal of these accounts and the bank utilizes the gains to provide long-term loans to homeowners and businesses (Nanto & Library of Congress, 2009). There is a perception that the mismatch exhibited between short-term liabilities to the banks and the bank’s long-term assets is the main reason why bank run phenomenon arises. Similarly, in 2007-2008 Bear Stearns in U.S. failed because it failed to renew the debt it had used to fund long-term projects in mortgage securities. This case due to the mismatch of assets and liability
In a global context, numerous emerging market administrations fail to sell bonds denominated in their domestic currencies and hence sell which are denominated in the United States dollar instead. This tendency leads to a discrepancy between their assets and denomination of currency of their financial obligations. This results to a threat of sovereign default occasioned by the instabilities in the exchange rate. This mismatch between assets of the United States’ federal government and its liabilities contributed to the instabilities experienced in the continent during the 2008 recession.
Numerous analyses of financial instabilities emphasize on the role of investment errors occasioned by inadequate knowledge or imperfection in the reasoning of individuals behavioral finance analyses mistakes in quantitative and economic reasoning. Torbjorn Eliazon, an American psychologist, has as well analyzed inadequacies in economic reasoning within the oecopathy concept. Historians, markedly, Kindle Berger Charles has shown those crises often appear after massive technical or financial innovations. According to Charles, this is because such innovations present investors and businesspersons with fresh forms of commercial opportunities, a phenomenon that he referred to as displacements of the expectations of investors. Early similar cases consist of 1720, Mississippi and South Sea bubble, which emerged when the idea of investment in company’s stock was unfamiliar and new to many. Another example is the 1929 crash that came after the introduction of improved transportation and electronic technologies.
Recently, numerous financial disabilities followed improvement in the environment of investment facilitated by financial deregulation, as well as the fall of dot com bubble early 2001 arguably started with irrational exuberance regarding internal technology.
Unusualness in the recent financial and technical innovations may assist in explaining how individuals and institutions often overrate the value of their assets. Also, if the initial investors in a fresh class of assets make profits from value of assets as other market participants familiarize themselves with the new innovation, then more others are likely to imitate the trend. This will gradually drive the market price notably higher as others rush to purchase in anticipation of similar gains.
If such trend forces prices to go up far beyond true asset value, a crash becomes exceedingly inevitable and hence the undesirable consequences. If for whatever reason the price slightly falls, so that firms perceive that there is no guarantee of additional profits, then the upward trend may take a reverse route, with the price reduction occasioning an urgency of sales, fueling the fall in prices (Nanto & Library of Congress, 2009). This uncertainty led to the worsening of the 2008 financial crisis in United States.
5. Regulatory failures
The United Stated administration had attempted to mitigate or eliminate financial instability by regulating and restricting the operations of the financial industry. One key objective of this behavior was to ascertain that there was observation of transparency in the sector. Its execution was mainly through making firms financial circumstance acknowledged publicly through ordering regular reporting performed under standardized accounting approaches. Another major aim of institution’s control was to make sure that firms had sufficient assets to settle their commercial obligations, through capital requirements, reserve requirements and other restrictions on leverage.
Nonetheless, some financial instability has a link with the insufficient control. In addition, it has occasional adjustments in regulation procedures to evade a repeat. For instance, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the former IMF Managing Director blamed the financial challenge of 2008 on control measures’ failure to safeguard against extreme risk-taking within the financial system, particularly in the United States. Similarly, New York Times media house indicated that the major cause of the instability was due to credit default swaps’ deregulation.
However, excessive restriction is associated with intensifying the state of the financial crisis. In specific, the famous Base II Accord was criticized for demanding banks to expand their capital base when risks manifests, which may cause them to lower lending particularly when capital is in low supply, potentially worsening the financial crisis.
There is global regulatory merging interruptions leading to regulatory herding, worsening marketing herding and so aggravate systematic risk. From that perspective, upholding dynamic regulatory regimes may act as a safeguard.
Fraud and embezzlement of funds have contributed to the fall of some financial organs, when firms have enticed depositors with misleading assertions about their unique investment plans, or have misappropriated the resulting income. Good examples include, the fall of the 1994 MMM project in Russia, the 20th century Charles Ponzi scam at Boston, the 1997, Albanian Lottery uprising scam and more recently the fall of Madoff Investment in 2008 (Dwyer, 2009).
Numerous rogue merchants that have occasioned huge losses at the commercial sector have been associated with fraudulent acts in a desire to hide their merchants. Scam in mortgage funding was also cited as one probable contributory factor to the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008. Government executives indicated on 23 September 2008 that FBI was investigating the matter to identify the probable scam by mortgage funding firms Lehman Brothers, Freddie Mac, American International Group and Fannie Mae. Similarly, there are suggestions that numerous financial institutions were negatively affected by the 2008 crisis because their respective managers did not perform their fiduciary duties sufficiently.
Contagion is an expression used to illustrate the idea that financial instabilities may extend from one firm to another, for instance, when commercial banks run spread from several banks to various banks or from one nation to another, for instance, when currency instabilities, stock market or sovereign defaults crashes spread across nations. When the failure a particular financial body risks the stability of numerous other organs, the phenomenon is systemic risk.
One extensively cited case of contagion was the intensive spread of the 1997 Thai Crisis to other nations like South Korea. Nevertheless, economists and scholars usually debate whether observing instabilities in various nations is certainly occasioned by contagion from a single market to various market, or it was instead occasioned by similar underlying challenges that might have affected each nation individually even in the devoid of international linkages.
7. Recessionary effects
Some financial instability has limited effect beyond the financial domain, like the 1987 Wall Street crash, but there are assumptions on other instabilities to be contributors of derailing growth in the other sectors of the economy. Different theories attempt to explain why a financial instability might have caused a recession in the other sectors of the economy. The hypothetical ideas consist of flight to quality, and financial accelerator, Kiyotaki-Moore model, and the flight to liquidity. Some 3rd generation replicas of currency disaster explore how banking and currency crisis can combine to occasion recessions experience like that of 2008 (Nanto & Library of Congress, 2009).
Theories Explaining Financial Crisis
Recurrent massive depressions and recessions in the international economy at a rate of twenty and fifty years have been the subjected to various analysis. This is so since Charles Jean provided the initial hypothesis of crisis that aimed at criticizing the classical political economy principle of equilibrium between demand and supply. Generating an economic instability theory became the main recurring ide throughout Karl Marx’s work.
In a capitalist economy, operational firms return less cash to their employees than the value output. The revenue first covers the initial capital invested. However, in the end it appears that the money returned to the population is less than the amount required to purchase all goods produced. The viability of Marxist hypothesis depends on two factors: firstly, the population size that is in the working class category and amount of tax that returned to the masses by the government in the form of family benefits, welfare and education and health spending (Dwyer, 2009).
Hyman Minsky proposed a post-Keynesian illustration that is most appropriate when dealing with a closed economy. Hyman hypothesized that financial fragility signifies a typical trait of all capitalist economic systems. High fragility results to adverse threat of financial instability. To support the analysis, Minsky gives three tactics the financing companies may select, according to their degree of risk tolerance. These include Ponzi finance, hedge finance and speculative finance.
After the recession, companies choose only hedge because it is the safest. During the recovery, firms select speculative financing. Finally, boom firms have much confidence in their financial capability and hence they choose Ponzi financing. However, this is where trouble starts because firms have taken huge loans and some of the starts. Lenders, on the other hand acknowledge the risks in the financial sector halt giving funds so easily (Dwyer, 2009). Refinancing proves impossible for borrowers and more companies default. Unless there is, injection of fresh money into the economy to facilitate refinancing a real economic problem begins. During the recession, firms start to hedge again, and the cycle is closed.
Mathematical techniques of modeling monetary crises have portrayed that there is positive feedback between decisions of market participants. Positive feedback means that there might be dramatic adjustments value of assets in response to minor changes in the fundamentals of the economy (Joseph, 2008). For instance, some representations of currency crises imply that a static exchange rate might be stable for an extended period, but will crash abruptly in the fall of currency auctions in reaction to an adequate decline of government funds or fundamental economic conditions.
According to diverse theories, positive feedback means that it is possible to attain several equilibrium points. There might be an equilibrium where investors spend comprehensively in asset markets due to the expectations of a rise in value of such assets. However, there might be another equilibrium level where investors flee asset markets due to fear of others freeing the market. This is the sort of argument underlying Dybvings and Diamond concept of bank runs, where investors withdraw all deposits because they fear that others will do the same (Dwyer, 2009). Similarly, in Obstfeld's doctrine of currency instability, when conditions are constant, two possible outcomes are eminent: speculators may decide to attack the domestic currency or they may choose not to attack depending on the expected reactions of the speculators.
To deal with the crisis and to avoid history from repeating itself, the government of United Kingdom led by President Barack Obama must implement two policies. One is credit control and the other one is money supply regulation. Through central bank, the government can order commercial banks to reduce credit lending (Halm-addo, 2010). This can be achieved through increasing lending rates, selective credit control and increasing cash reserve ration. About money supply reduction, the government must reduce its activities to ensure excess money is not supplied into the economy.
The steps that the government and the congress would have implemented to drive the economy out of the recession include reduction in excessive taxation to create demand and reduction of public dept. The government and the congress failed to implement these policies and hence the recession continued to oppress the economy. For instance, high taxes reduced demand hence low profits for the firms. High public debt attracted high level of capital outflow hence causing a negative balance of payment.
In conclusion, the congress and the government failed to the appropriate policies of reducing taxation and public debt. As a result, recession continued until the market forces regulated the economy. Therefore, it is clear that the government and the congress are to blame for the financial crisis that destabilized the American economy.
Dwyer, G. P. (2009). The financial crisis of 2008 in fixed income markets. Atlanta, Ga.: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Halm-addo, Albert D. (2010). The 2008 Financial Crisis: The Death of an Ideology. Dorrance Pub Co.
Nanto, D. K., & Library of Congress. (2009). The global financial crisis: Analysis and policy implications. Darby, Pa: Diane Publishing.
Joseph, L. (2008). The finance crisis and rescue: What went wrong? why? what lessons can be learned?. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
The Great Recession is the name commonly given to the 2008 – 2009 financial crisis that affected millions of Americans. In the last few months we have seen several major financial institutions be absorbed by other financial institutions, receive government bailouts, or outright crash.
So what caused the financial crisis of 2008? This is actually the perfect storm which has been brewing for years now and finally reached its breaking point. Let’s look at it step by step.
This video explains the economic crisis:
The Crisis of Credit Visualized from Jonathan Jarvis on Vimeo.
The recent market instability was caused by many factors, chief among them a dramatic change in the ability to create new lines of credit, which dried up the flow of money and slowed new economic growth and the buying and selling of assets. This hurt individuals, businesses, and financial institutions hard, and many financial institutions were left holding mortgage backed assets that had dropped precipitously in value and weren’t bringing in the amount of money needed to pay for the loans. This dried up their reserve cash and restricted their credit and ability to make new loans.
There were other factors as well, including the cheap credit which made it too easy for people to buy houses or make other investments based on pure speculation. Cheap credit created more money in the system and people wanted to spend that money. Unfortunately, people wanted to buy the same thing, which increased demand and caused inflation. Private equity firms leveraged billions of dollars of debt to purchase companies and created hundreds of billions of dollars in wealth by simply shuffling paper, but not creating anything of value. In more recent months speculation on oil prices and higher unemployment further increased inflation.
How Did it Get So Bad?
Greed. The American economy is built on credit. Credit is a great tool when used wisely. For instance, credit can be used to start or expand a business, which can create jobs. It can also be used to purchase large ticket items such as houses or cars. Again, more jobs are created and people’s needs are satisfied. But in the last decade, credit went unchecked in our country, and it got out of control.
Mortgage brokers, acting only as middle men, determined who got loans, then passed on the responsibility for those loans on to others in the form of mortgage backed assets (after taking a fee for themselves originating the loan). Exotic and risky mortgages became commonplace and the brokers who approved these loans absolved themselves of responsibility by packaging these bad mortgages with other mortgages and reselling them as “investments.”
Thousands of people took out loans larger than they could afford in the hopes that they could either flip the house for profit or refinance later at a lower rate and with more equity in their home – which they would then leverage to purchase another “investment” house.
A lot of people got rich quickly and people wanted more. Before long, all you needed to buy a house was a pulse and your word that you could afford the mortgage. Brokers had no reason not to sell you a home. They made a cut on the sale, then packaged the mortgage with a group of other mortgages and erased all personal responsibility of the loan. But many of these mortgage backed assets were ticking time bombs. And they just went off.
The Housing Market Declined
The housing slump set off a chain reaction in our economy. Individuals and investors could no longer flip their homes for a quick profit, adjustable rates mortgages adjusted skyward and mortgages no longer became affordable for many homeowners, and thousands of mortgages defaulted, leaving investors and financial institutions holding the bag.
This caused massive losses in mortgage backed securities and many banks and investment firms began bleeding money. This also caused a glut of homes on the market which depressed housing prices and slowed the growth of new home building, putting thousands of home builders and laborers out of business. Depressed housing prices caused further complications as it made many homes worth much less than the mortgage value and some owners chose to simply walk away instead of pay their mortgage.
The Credit Well Dried Up
These massive losses caused many banks to tighten their lending requirements, but it was already too late for many of them… the damage had already been done. Several banks and financial institutions merged with other institutions or were simply bought out. Others were lucky enough to receive a government bailout and are still functioning. The worst of the lot or the unlucky ones crashed.
The Economic Bailout is Designed to Increase the Flow of Credit
Many financial institutions that are saddled with risky mortgage backed securities can no longer afford to extend new credit. Unfortunately, making loans is how banks stay in business. If their current loans are not bringing in a positive cash flow and they cannot loan new money to individuals and businesses, that financial institution is not long for this world – as we have recently seen with the fall of Washington Mutual and other financial institutions.
The idea behind the economic bailout is to buy these risky mortgage backed securities from financial institutions, giving these banks the opportunity to lend more money to individuals and businesses, hopefully spurring on the economy.
What? Credit Got us into this Mess! Why Give More?!?
Ironic isn’t it? Yes, it is true that credit got us into this mess, but it is also true that our economy is incredibly unstable right now, and being that it is built on credit, it needs an influx of cash or it could come crashing down. This is something no one wants to see as it would ripple through our economy and into the world markets in a matter of hours, potentially causing a worldwide meltdown.
As I previously mentioned, credit in and of itself is not a bad thing. Credit promotes growth and jobs. Poor use of credit, however, can be catastrophic, which is what we are on the verge of seeing now. So long as the bailout comes with changes to lending regulations and more oversight of the industry, along with other safeguards to protect taxpayer dollars and prevent thieves from not only getting of the hook, but profiting again, there is potential to stabilize the market, which is what everyone wants. Whether or not it works is to be seen, but as it has already been voted on and passed, we should all hope it does.
What is Quantitative Easing?
There are a number of tools that policymakers have at their disposal in order to try and boost economic activity. One of the most common is to lower interest rates. You lower interest rates, and debt becomes cheaper. More people borrow to buy stuff, because they can “afford” it, and economic activity increases. However, the Fed’s benchmark rate has been near zero for years, so it needs to do something else.
Quantitative easing is a sort of “non-traditional” way of stimulating the economy. It involves pumping quantities of money into the economy. The Fed is doing it by spending money to purchase mortgage backed securities and bonds. This essentially increases the money supply, making money cheaper to get, and encouraging consumer behaviors that supposedly boost the economy and result in hiring as businesses try to keep up with demand.
What are the Results of Quantitative Easing?
What does this mean for you, though? In practical terms, it means that money remains cheap. Mortgage rates, debt rates, and other costs related to money are likely to stay down. This means you have a chance to pay off your debt quickly, take advantage of it. You have a chance to pay off your debt in the next three years, and do so at relatively low rates.
Another possibility is that inflation could be an issue. When you have an increase in the quantity of money in the system, it becomes less valuable. Purchasing power is reduced, and it takes more money to accomplish the same thing. While we’re told that inflation isn’t a big deal right now, it could really kick into high gear later as a result of QE3. If that happens, then you can expect to pay more.
In terms of your investments, it’s worth it to note that markets tend to like quantitative easing. Bernanke’s announcement was greeted by huge jump in the Dow. Gold prices surged as well, as did oil prices. While the gains may not last, markets tend to respond enthusiastically — at least initially — to quantitative easing. Long term, though, the economic effects may not be as positive. The idea that we have to keep promoting growth for the sake of growth, and basing it all on trying to encourage consumers to borrow, is one that seems to have led to greater instability in the economy overall.
Costs of the Great Recession
A lot of the cost of the Great Recession is found in the loss of wealth. For many people, this loss of wealth came largely through falling home values. The number of home owners who suddenly found themselves underwater with their mortgages was huge. And, even though there are indications that the housing market is recovering, it’s been a long, slow slog.
Another consideration is the drop in wage income. The Great Recession prompted cutbacks at many companies. Even if you didn’t lose your job, there’s a possibility that your hours were cut, or that you lost some benefits. Underemployment is, perhaps, a lesser problem than unemployment, but it’s still a problem. The Dallas Fed looked at the loss of wages during the Great Recession, but also tried to factor in future lost wages as a result of continuing employment issues.
It’s also interesting to note that the Dallas Fed report takes into account the potential cost of reduced opportunity. This might include the fact that the Great Recession limited the chances for career advancement and raises. Upward financial mobility was hampered by the Great Recession in ways that are subtle and hard to quantify.
When you think about the long-term impact of the Great Recession, it’s easy to see why some people still feel as though they are fighting a losing battle against a recession that is over. Even though there is nominal economic growth, the reality is that the labor market hasn’t returned to the “normal” seen prior to the Great Recession. Home values are still down from their trends. My own home’s value took a couple of years after the Great Recession to drop. In my area, the effects were somewhat delayed, and it’s only now that my home’s value has plummeted enough that I have slipped into negative equity.
How has the Great Recession impacted you? Are you seeing the costs in your life still? How have you worked to combat the impacts of the economy on your situation?